Experts: NATO would not launch an infrastructure patrol mission over an accident

Security experts Erkki Koort, Marek Kohv and Meelis Oidsalu have cast doubt on a claim published in The Washington Post, which cited anonymous sources suggesting that security agencies investigating the damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea believe the incident was an accident rather than sabotage.
On Sundat, The Washington Post (WP) reported (paywalled), citing anonymous sources, that European and U.S. security agencies are inclined to believe that the recent cable damages in the Baltic Sea were accidents rather than acts of sabotage. Following WP's publication, Finnish outlet Yle reported that the Finnish police investigating the cable damage disagreed with the claims made in the article.
Erkki Koort, head of the Internal Security Institute at the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, told ERR the article focuses on the absence of concrete evidence from Russian intelligence sources indicating that the country instructed ship crews to damage infrastructure.
Commenting on the article, Koort highlighted that following the cable break, leaders of Baltic Sea states met in Helsinki and NATO sent additional ships to the region.
"If Baltic Sea states believed this wasn't sabotage, I'd be very surprised if their prime ministers were so easily convinced and NATO visibly deployed additional ships to the Baltic Sea," he said.
The expert emphasized the article does not dispute that the cables were damaged by the vessel Eagle S but rather discusses the lack of evidence of direct orders from Russia. "What was particularly strange in the article was the suggestion that perhaps it was such a well-executed operation by the Russians that no traces were left. The usual goal of intelligence operations is precisely that — leaving no trace."
Koort noted that some are fixated on the absence of a documented Russian intelligence plan, such as paying the captain or first mate of the Eagle S to drag an anchor across the seabed until cables break. "That's what the article focused on. But such plans rarely come to light and obtaining them from another country's intelligence service is extremely difficult," he said.
Koort also questioned the sources on which the article relied.
When asked by ERR if WP could have fallen for a Russian disinformation operation by publishing an article based on anonymous sources, Koort replied, "It's not out of the question."
At the same time, he admitted that an intelligence source might have expressed genuine doubts.
"It's true, as mentioned in the article, that the crews of shadow fleet vessels are often less experienced than those of regular ships. But to conclude from this that so many cables have broken over a year and a half — when in the previous 20 years, there hadn't been this extent of damage within such a timeframe — is a stretch. There have been times in the past when less experienced crews have operated in the Baltic Sea," Koort said.
He added that misleading claims were made during the cable breakages, suggesting that infrastructure in international waters falls into a legal gray area. "Intentionally damaging a cable is a crime, regardless of where it's located, and it is prohibited. Much of the discussion focused on a false assumption that this is some kind of gray zone between territorial seas," Koort concluded.
Kohv: Intentional misinformation cannot be ruled out
Marek Kohv, head of the Security and Resilience Program at the International Centre for Defense and Security (ICDS), explained that publishing articles based on anonymous sources is very common in the United States. "On the one hand, this can produce excellent journalism on topics that might otherwise never reach the public. On the other hand, there's always the risk of personal agendas or the spread of misinformation."
Kohv emphasized that it's important to remember that the opinions of individual intelligence officers are often just that — personal opinions. By contrast, the positions of intelligence agencies represent consolidated information that has been analyzed and often cross-referenced with the views of partner agencies.
"Therefore, taking the information provided by a few anonymous individuals and presenting it as the whole truth is, at best, misleading," Kohv said. "Considering Russia's previous hybrid attacks and the ongoing transition in the U.S. administration, the possibility of deliberate disinformation cannot be ruled out. The narrative of an accident is precisely what Russia would prefer to dominate discussions surrounding their hybrid attacks."
Kohv noted that the security agencies of Baltic Sea and Gulf of Finland countries likely have much better insight and knowledge of Russia's activities in this region than individual intelligence officers from Western Europe or the United States. "It's also worth remembering that attributing hybrid attacks is one of the biggest challenges in this field. Obtaining definitive confirmation may require lengthy criminal investigations," Kohv added.
Oidsalu: Intelligence services have released no official positions
Independent security expert Meelis Oidsalu pointed out on social media that the intelligence agencies allegedly cited anonymously in The Washington Post article have not shared public assessments in the media of their respective countries. Oidsalu also noted that NATO likely did not launch its Baltic Sea cable protection operation on the assumption that the incident was accidental.
According to Oidsalu, it is worth asking whether the alleged intelligence assessments are comprehensive, whether they explain what is happening on the ground and what the long-term trends and statistics for cable damage look like. He highlighted that the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences produced a report on cable damage statistics in 2024.
"Based on submarine connection disruptions in various parts of Europe over the past three years, it is clear — even without officially confirmed data — that the number of intentional, human-caused incidents targeting submarine infrastructure has increased in this region," the report states.
The report also notes that since 2021, there have been eight suspicious cable breakage incidents in the Euro-Atlantic region and over 70 documented reports of Russian vessels behaving unusually near critical maritime infrastructure.
Saks: Article based on abstract intelligence data
Expert Rainer Saks declined to comment extensively on the matter to ERR. He noted that The Washington Post article is based on abstract intelligence data and that information on the issue can best be provided by authorities directly involved in the investigation.
Finnish authorities suspect that the tanker Eagle S, registered in the Cook Islands, dragged an anchor along the seabed, severing the EstLink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia on Christmas Day and possibly damaging four data cables. Eagle S is considered part of Russia's shadow fleet, used by Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions imposed in response to its invasion of Ukraine.
Last week, the leaders of eight NATO member states bordering the Baltic Sea held an extraordinary meeting in Helsinki, where they unveiled an action plan to address incidents of underwater infrastructure damage. The alliance also launched a new patrol mission in the Baltic Sea to protect maritime infrastructure.
Former president: Some countries do not want to deal with this
Former foreign minister and President Toomas Hendrik Ilves (2006-2016) was highly critical of the article, especially of the use of anonymous sources.
He pointed out the views of these anonymous sources and security experts quoted on the record differed hugely.
The headline – "Accidents, not Russian sabotage, behind undersea cable damage, officials say" – only reflected one side of the discussion, the former minister said.
"Anonymous people unconvinced means one of several countries who do not want the issue brought to the fore. We've seen this before in 2007 [during the Bronze Soldier riots in Tallinn] when we had massive cyberattacks," Ilves said.
"There were countries that couldn't tell the difference between a toaster oven and a laptop telling Estonians we did not know what we were talking about. So we've been there before /.../ I personally see this as another attempt to calm things down."
The former president also highlighted that the unknown security sources could have been from countries that want to ignore the situation.
"There are countries that do not wish to address these issues and say, 'well it's not really that [Russia]...' because it is too difficult to actually name who is responsible, it's politically too difficult," he said, speaking at a public discussion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the future of the Council of Baltic Sea States.
This article was updated to add comments from Toomas Hendrik Ilves.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski, Helen Wright