In a situation where fatigue with the Russia-Ukraine war is becoming dominant both in Ukraine itself and in the West, there is increasing talk of the need for, if not peace, then at least a ceasefire and a halt to hostilities. In this context, great hopes are being placed on the new U.S. president, Donald Trump. However, well-known Ukrainian journalist and publicist Vitali Portnikov, whose predictions have a grim tendency to come true, does not share such hopes. Portnikov spoke about Russia's war in Ukraine as well as other conflicts into which the modern world is descending.

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We spoke with you a year ago, and even then you said that the answer to the question of when and how Russia's war against Ukraine will end depends on the results of the U.S. presidential election. Now the results are known – Donald Trump will be the next president. How and to what extent will his victory affect what happens to Ukraine?

Of course, Donald Trump's victory is of great importance, if only because it will determine how the United States will help Ukraine in the future. How large will military aid be? What will the financial assistance amount to? How long will this aid last at all? What conclusions will Donald Trump draw from his diplomatic efforts?

In general, I believe the U.S. is already in a weak position because Donald Trump wants to talk with Vladimir Putin, whereas his predecessor Joe Biden abandoned negotiations after Russia's attack on Ukraine. If, three years after the start of this major war, the U.S. president says: "You know, it turns out we cannot really stand up to Russia or contain its aggressive ambitions, we want to talk to him and reach an agreement," – then that is already a weak position. And we don't know what Vladimir Putin would demand from someone in such a weak position, or what Donald Trump would agree to.

However, even if we assume that all these diplomatic efforts end in failure – and I completely believe that they will – the gap between the last parts of American aid approved under Biden and whatever form of new aid under Trump could be significant. Overall, Trump and his supporters blocked this aid for six months, the aid we are currently spending. And this largely triggered the events we are seeing now. Therefore, if they block aid for another six months, it will lead to a further deterioration of the situation.

That's why I'm very surprised when some people say: "Trump will come, reach an agreement with Putin and end the war." I don't understand what that's based on, other than their own wishes or some statements made by the old and new American presidents. Words are very nice, but we need to talk about real possibilities.

Just a year ago, President Zelenskyy's peace plan was on the agenda. When he visited Tallinn last winter, I asked him why he saw the potential freezing of the conflict as beneficial only to Russia and not to Ukraine. Now we see that there is no longer such a unanimous stance on refusing negotiations. How ready is Ukraine's leadership right now to negotiate with Russia?

I think it doesn't matter what Ukraine's leadership is ready for. What matters is what Russia's leadership is ready for. You say that a year ago President Zelenskyy's peace plan was relevant. It couldn't have been relevant – it was a collection of wishes aimed at the allies.

Any peace plan is possible only if both sides of the conflict want peace. At the time Zelenskyy presented his peace plan, Russia had no desire to end the war. So, it was more of a vision of a just world through the eyes of the Ukrainian president, not a peace plan. This vision is not connected to realpolitik; it's more like a literary work reflecting how we would like the world to be.

But real peace comes when both sides are interested in ending the war. As Donald Trump, by the way, said to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, "It takes two to tango." But there is no second dancer in this pair, and perhaps there won't be one in the coming years.

It's also not important how Ukraine's leadership views ending the war. What's important is whether Vladimir Putin intends to end this war. Does Putin have the economic potential to continue this war? If he does, then he will continue, and neither the Ukrainian leadership's vision of negotiations nor the American leadership's will change this situation.

What arguments might there be for Putin to end the war right now? His forces are advancing, the enemy is retreating and Putin's allies are more willing to help him than Ukraine's allies are. He has North Korea with its shells and possibly troops, Iran with drones and, finally, China. Does this mean that Putin will continue the war until his forces capture Dnipro, Kyiv or Lviv and eventually reach the borders of NATO countries like Poland, Slovakia etc.?

The answer to this question is tied solely to Russia's economic potential. Whether Russia has the economic capacity for the extensive war you describe is a great mystery to us. Even if Russia is advancing in Ukraine right now, you can imagine for yourself how many years it would take to reach Kyiv at this pace, let alone Lviv. In reality, Russia's economic potential decreases with each year of war.

But so does Ukraine's...

Of course, but it depends on the support Ukraine receives. We must understand that Ukraine is not alone in this war. If Ukraine were alone, then, naturally, this country would disappear. But as long as Ukraine receives support from the West, this becomes a war of attrition for both Ukraine and Russia. I agree – Putin has no incentive to end the war today. However, those incentives may appear if he sees that his economy cannot sustain further war. As soon as he realizes this, the war will immediately stall.

Currently, the pace at which Russian forces are occupying Ukrainian territory corresponds to an arithmetic progression – over recent months, after the fall of Avdiivka, their rate of advance has been almost the same. But could this pace grow into a geometric progression, something that could be described as the front collapsing? In that case, it wouldn't take years to reach Kyiv; instead, by spring, we would see Russian forces occupying all four so-called new Russian territories, meaning the entire Ukrainian Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.

First of all, capturing the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts is far from reaching Kyiv. Secondly, in this case, a geometric progression means that at some point, the attacker will encounter an obstacle they cannot overcome. This could happen because advancing means new positions and new locations. It also requires new technological solutions, as war evolves: not long ago, it was a missile war; now it is a drone war. And this development will continue.

So, I simply do not believe that Russia can achieve such a result quickly with its offensive. And most importantly, Russia's advances would increase fear in the West that such significant success could already threaten the security of Western countries. Perhaps not the United States – perhaps Donald Trump thinks differently – but in Europe, the perception of the forms and pace of supporting Ukraine could change.

How do you view the rhetoric of recent weeks in Europe, suggesting that Europe must be ready to support Ukraine even if U.S. aid decreases or stops? Can Europe effectively help Ukraine without American involvement?

I believe that saving a drowning person is ultimately the responsibility of the one drowning. If Europeans understand that Ukraine's collapse would essentially mean the collapse of the European project as we've known it since the post-war years, then they can act. If they are unwilling to grasp this, then, unfortunately, the European project will reach its logical conclusion.

In reality, there are two ways out of this conflict: helping Ukraine, providing it with real security guarantees – such as NATO membership and then accession to the European Union – or accepting Russia's dominant role on the continent.

This is roughly the same choice that European countries faced in 1938 when they decided that the conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia would be resolved at Czechoslovakia's expense. In other words, they accepted Germany's dominant role on the continent to maintain peace in Europe. But within a year, World War II began, and many Europeans who dreamed of peace soon found themselves either dead, witnessing their homes in ruins or forced to take part in the conflict themselves.

Exactly the same awaits Europeans today. If they accept Russia's dominant role on the continent, it doesn't mean Russia will be satisfied with just Ukraine. Russia will continue to exert pressure, governments in European countries will turn to right- or left-wing populism and Europe will be drawn into countless conflicts linked to internal instability. I'm referring to conflicts in those European countries where Russia, wary of NATO, does not openly want to engage in war. Given the weakening geopolitical role of the United States, this outcome seems quite logical.

Until Hitler came to power in Germany, Karlovy Vary seemed to many like an idyllic town where the German population simply dominated. They might not have loved Czechoslovakia, but they didn't intend to wage war against it either. German-origin ministers sat in Czechoslovakia's government – not Nazis, of course, but Social Democratic ministers who shared the same party values as the local Czechs and Slovaks.

Today, a place like Narva may seem like an idyllic small town on the border with Russia. But you cannot imagine how things would change if Russia defeats Ukraine. I wouldn't bet a cent on the prospect of a secure life in Estonia after that.

What would the security guarantees [for Ukraine] look like? Could they replace NATO membership, which, according to Keith Kellogg's plan (Donald Trump's special envoy to Ukraine – ed.), might be postponed for 10 or 20 years? Could such guarantees apply only to the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government, but not to the occupied areas – so that everyone would agree to them?

Mr. Kellogg's plan is very similar to the Munich Agreement. It doesn't actually solve anything because it does not provide real security guarantees for the victim of aggression. If a political solution to the war cannot be found, there are only two ways to end it – at the expense of either the victim or the aggressor. Mr. Kellogg proposes ending the war at the victim's expense, where Ukraine receives no security guarantees, while the aggressor is given the opportunity to consolidate control over the occupied territories and is encouraged to pursue further conquests. In essence, you shift the responsibility for future conquests onto the victim – "We're giving you plenty of weapons, but if you can't use them effectively, that's your problem, not ours."

However, there is another – what I would call a less humiliating – way to end the war. This involves telling the aggressor: "Yes, you're standing here, this is the line you've reached and we don't want to fight with you. You are a nuclear power and we are a nuclear bloc. But if you want to go further, we are ready and will not let you advance any farther. You've marked out the areas where you stand – so stay there. Here is Ukraine, the Western world, and NATO – and there is your zone of interests."

This way, we could stop and then think about negotiations, a political future and the restoration of territorial integrity. This would end the war at the aggressor's expense. Incidentally, this was not done in 1938 when the conflict in Munich was resolved at Czechoslovakia's expense, and the Czechs and Slovaks were simply informed of the conditions. Ultimately, this led not only to the destruction of Czechoslovakia but also to World War II.

Plans like Mr. Kellogg's could similarly lead to a world war. That is why I believe Mr. Trump's presidency, through such foreign policy approaches, could result in World War III. Because this is the approach of small children – even if they are 80 years old – who, while talking about peace, are simply playing with matches.

This year, Vladimir Putin clarified somewhat the goals of his "special military operation" (known by the Russian abbreviation SVO, as Russian authorities demand the war in Ukraine be called – ed.), proposing that Ukraine withdraw its forces from four oblasts – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. For our part, we tell him that we do not recognize the areas occupied by Russia, we will continue to arm Ukraine and we intend to bring Ukraine into the EU and NATO – or, if not, to provide security guarantees such as NATO contingents stationed on Ukrainian territory and along the front line. I don't understand how this plan is fundamentally different from President Zelenskyy's peace plan, because neither seems to satisfy Putin in any way. Why should we hope that such proposals might fundamentally interest him?

Because we have, quite literally, a religious faith in Donald Trump. The belief that Trump will call someone and agree on something is based on nothing but faith. You're talking here about some kind of conditions set by Putin – these are not conditions; they are pretexts to continue the war. President Putin does not set conditions whose fulfillment would end the war; instead, he invents conditions meant to justify its continuation.

Putin's main objective is to restore Russian statehood to the 1991 borders of the Soviet Union, perhaps – let's reassure ourselves – excluding the Baltic states. That's because they are NATO members, and the decision for a conflict with NATO has not yet been made, as it could involve the use of nuclear weapons.

If we were to put ourselves in Putin's place, we would set conditions that the enemy a priori could not accept, allowing us to continue the war until their destruction.

And I'll tell you a secret: even if the West accepts all of Putin's conditions, he will present new ones. More will come – just like in 1938. Before Munich, Hitler also made many demands; they were accepted, but in the end, everything still culminated in Munich. Hitler presented conditions that were designed to bring the existence of the Czechoslovak state to its logical end, and as a result, he achieved his goal within a year and a half. Putin is acting the same way. If the West agrees to freeze the war under conditions that ensure Ukraine's disappearance within the next two years, Putin will accept those conditions.

For example, Ukraine's demilitarization combined with Ukraine agreeing to lose control over Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, while the West refuses to assist it and instead offers fictitious guarantees. Yes, the war can be frozen in this way, so that in a year and a half or two years, Ukraine disappears – perhaps not even militarily but politically, through a vote by its own citizens, fearful of another potential war. Putin could act like this, that's true.

We cannot say that the conditions set by Putin to end the war are realistic. This is not where our focus should be, and that's the key point. That's why I keep saying that the war can only end either at the victim's expense or at the aggressor's expense. Until we understand that the only way to stop the war is either to force Ukraine to dismantle its statehood or to force Russia to end its aggression, the war will continue.

But is Ukrainian society fundamentally ready to hear what you are saying? I have the impression that people are simply hoping for some negotiations, and while they don't say out loud that they are willing to give up certain territories, they are, in principle, already thinking about it.

Ukrainian society is not ready to hear what I am saying. Recently, we discussed Volodymyr Zelenskyy's and Valerii Zaluzhnyi's electoral prospects on our podcast, and I said that such discussions are pointless if it's unclear whether the country itself will even survive. What does it matter who is president of something that might disappear? But people take this lightly. They truly don't understand the scale of the problem. Or they simply don't believe that something like this could happen – just as they didn't believe it in 2019. (In 2019, Zelenskyy won the presidential election promising a peaceful resolution in Donbas – ed.). That also became an example, I would say, of an irresponsible attitude toward reality.

I think most people are not ready for anything. They believe that if Trump talks to Putin, he will somehow end the war. I don't rule this out because neither you nor I know Russia's economic situation.

If Vladimir Putin is interested in stopping the conflict, he can use Trump to end it on conditions that are relatively comfortable for him. You and I might believe that Russia's economy isn't in very good shape, or perhaps the Kremlin believes it won't be in very good shape in 2025 – and in that case, it might indeed be better to stop rather than destabilize their economy further. But this has nothing to do with whom Trump calls or what he says. It depends entirely on how Putin assesses his country's economic situation.

All right, if we cannot influence the situation on the battlefield – and judging by the changes on the front line, Western aid is insufficient for this – then how can we impact Russia's economic situation to weaken Putin's ability to continue the war?

A trade war with China – that's exactly what Trump is talking about. The survival of Russia's economy depends on China's capabilities. Broadly speaking, Russia is China's proxy. The less we trade with China, the fewer Chinese goods we buy, the higher the tariffs on Chinese products and the more seriously we address the threat posed by China – the less China will be able to help Russia or Iran. It's very simple. If China doesn't need Russian oil, then where will Russia sell it? Who will become the buyer?

By the way, there's also India, with whom serious discussions must take place about their economic interests in Russia. This means that without an economic war with the Global South, the West will not survive. And this doesn't apply only to the Russia-Ukraine war. The West can no longer exert economic pressure on countries that violate the rules of coexistence established after World War II. Any country can afford aggressive actions without fearing Western pressure and sanctions because China and India are there.

If you don't bring Western companies out of China, if you continue to exist at the expense of Chinese consumer goods, then you must accept that you are already digging your own grave.

It turns out that while Donald Trump's plans regarding Russia seem wrong or utopian to you, you view his aggressive plans toward China with understanding and approval?

Yes! I've been saying this all along, since the start of the war. Unfortunately, no one in Kyiv wants to hear it. As we know, Ukraine's leadership is trying to establish some sort of relationship with China. Here, a phone call between the chairman of the People's Republic of China and Ukraine's president was hailed as a major diplomatic achievement, and they made every effort to invite China to the peace forum held in Switzerland. Many politicians here see any attempt to develop relations with Taiwan as a threat to Ukraine's national security – but the reality is entirely different!

In this sense, I believe that the alternative economy of the Global South – specifically China's economy, which has been built up by the West's desire to create an alternative market for the production and consumption of consumer goods – is the key to all the problems we are dealing with right now.

Imagine if China and India had not been buying Russian oil for the past two and a half years. Do you think Putin would have continued the war? Let me ask you: with what money? At the very least, he would know for certain that all resources had already been exhausted. There would no longer be money to pay contract soldiers, ensure social stability or prevent wage and pension arrears etc.

Is there any rational basis in Trump's idea of pulling Russia away from China? Many interpreted this as the need to offer Russia a carrot instead of a stick – something that would outweigh all the benefits of cooperation with China. For example, giving Russia Ukraine so that it wouldn't align with China?

The United States does not have such a carrot. In fact, I believe this is not about Ukraine at all, but about the international order. Both Putin and [Russian Foreign Minister] Sergei Lavrov constantly say that this is not about Ukraine – they demand a change to the world order.

For Putin, the disappearance of a unipolar world where democracies set the rules of coexistence is crucial. They want a world divided between democracies and dictatorships. In this sense, China's goals are much clearer to Russia than the goals of the United States.

The United States does not want to divide the world with anyone; it wants all nations to adhere to shared principles and rules of mutual respect – respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law. China and Russia, on the other hand, think completely differently – they seek influence through force, based on their own strength, not through America.

By the way, what do you think Trump's words "peace through strength" mean?

I don't know what Trump means when he talks about "peace through strength" at a time when his main desire seems to be to force Russia into peace. What strength are we talking about? I believe that if Trump truly begins to speak the language of power with Russia and China, and forces Russia to end its aggression against Ukraine, then that would be peace through strength. But if we hear that Russia and Ukraine simply need to come to an agreement – as though Ukraine is just as responsible for this war as Russia – then that is not peace through strength. That is achieving peace through appeasement of the aggressor.

What kind of president do you think Trump will be, someone who is ready to speak softly with Russia and harshly with China? What would be the outcome of such a policy for the world and specifically for Ukraine?

I think it will lead to a geopolitical defeat. Trump will fail to reach an agreement with Russia while simultaneously strengthening the Russia-China alliance – when it is absolutely clear that the need is to weaken that alliance. If we prevent Russia from conquering Ukraine, we send a message to dictatorships that we are ready to fight for our principles. If we have no principles and act solely based on economic expediency, then we lose.

But again, we don't know how President Trump will act. We have to wait until January 2025. We need to see how President Trump actually responds to this development. Because it's clear that even what Trump is saying now – about making efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war – is not at all what he said before the elections. And once he is inaugurated, it will likely be yet another approach.

Therefore, we simply have to wait and see how things develop and avoid judging Donald Trump based on his slogans. Because slogans and actual actions in the Oval Office are not always the same.

I see that Ukrainian society is tired of the war and wants it to end...

They wanted to end it back in 2019.

What concessions are Ukrainians willing to make now, given that people have seen the war firsthand and understand what it entails? For example, would people agree to leave the occupied territories to Russia?

This isn't about Ukrainian society or concessions; it's about Russia's willingness to accept any kind of compromise. You're talking about the occupied territories. If Ukraine cannot liberate them, they will remain under Russian control regardless – that's not a concession, it's an objective reality. If we can liberate these territories, that's one reality; if we can't, it's another. So, this isn't a concession.

But the kind of concession that Dmitry Medvedev (former Russian president and current deputy chairman of the Security Council – ed.) once presented involves Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada convening in Kyiv and announcing Ukraine's accession to Russia. Do you remember that phrase of his?

Now, that is a concession, one that most of Ukrainian society would likely never accept. But even if we imagine a majority that would agree to something like this, there would always be a minority willing to die for their country, against the will of the majority. And that's a big problem for those who are ready to betray their statehood.

Precisely because such sentiments exist, I don't see any real possibility of an agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. This is a typical existential conflict, where two nations lay claim to the same territory – in this case, Ukrainian territory. The Russians believe this is the land of their ancestors, which should belong to them, and they are willing to pay their price for it. Ukrainians believe that this is not Russia but Ukrainian territory, and they want to live here in their sovereign country.

This is about preserving Ukrainian statehood – there's nothing new about this problem. As someone of Jewish descent, I remember well that a similar conflict existed between my people and the Roman Empire. Rome believed that it was their province of Judea, which Emperor Hadrian renamed Palestine, while the people living in and around Jerusalem believed it was a Jewish state that had nothing to do with Rome.

That ended badly for the Jewish state…

It ended badly for the Jewish state, but the Jewish people returned to those lands when Emperor Hadrian was nothing more than archaeological dust.

I'll repeat the question I asked you a year ago. Do other conflicts – such as the one in the Middle East – divert the West's attention away from Ukraine? Do they hinder Ukraine in its fight?

Now it's becoming increasingly clear that we are dealing with a chain of global, long-term conflicts. When we spoke last fall, few could have imagined that the conflict in the Middle East would last nearly 500 days. Did I tell you back then that this would be a long conflict?

Yes.

But few people believed it, including in Israel. Everyone thought that it would all end very soon with a ceasefire, the exchange of hostages... Now President Trump is demanding the release of all hostages before taking office. I have serious doubts whether Hamas is ready to comply with the demands of America's president-elect.

Conflicts are not ending right now precisely because they occur in the most vulnerable places, where two nations lay claim to the same territory. Palestinian Arabs claim the territory of the Jewish state and want a land without Jews. And the Jews living in Israel want their state to survive.

What could be the political solution to this problem? No matter what the pro-Palestinian demonstrators in Europe or the U.S., chanting "from the river to the sea," might think – the answer is: none! Because the Jews will not leave and the Palestinian Arabs will not accept the existence of a Jewish state. It is clear that this is a long-term conflict, and such conflicts only deepen over time.

Does this mean that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will develop along the lines of the Middle East?

Yes, if the West does not show political will. In Europe, this can be demonstrated; in the Middle East, it is harder but still possible. In the past, the West showed political will, which led to reconciliation between Israel and several of its Arab neighbors. Now, we can follow the same path and achieve a similar result.

If we stop Iran – again, by weakening China – we can undermine Iran's proxy armies in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. Lebanon can, in fact, be turned into a peaceful, normal state if we eliminate Iran's and Hezbollah's influence there. Even in the Palestinian territories, it's possible to achieve at least coexistence and an agreement for the creation of a Palestinian state that does not harm Jewish interests. This is still achievable, although the likelihood diminishes with each passing year.

But this is not the last conflict. We may also witness a conflict on the Korean Peninsula – we are approaching that threshold. I am convinced that Russia's cooperation with North Korea could lead to Pyongyang developing very serious revanchist ambitions.

Against the backdrop of all the conflicts you've described, the Russia-Ukraine war seems to become very small…

...a part of what we might call the prelude to World War III. It is very important for us to understand the key question: has World War III already begun, as Valerii Zaluzhnyi says, or is this just its prelude?

The events in Czechoslovakia were the prelude to World War II. Italy's war in Ethiopia was the prelude to World War II. The Soviet Union's war with Finland and the subsequent occupation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – all of this was the prelude to World War II.

But in reality, World War II began precisely then – when Italy invaded Ethiopia, the Soviet Union attacked Finland and Hitler reached an agreement with Chamberlain and Daladier to partition Czechoslovakia. Back then, no one knew this! Today, we understand it clearly, but we still consider September 1, 1939, the official start date of World War II.

Are we already in 1939?

We are still in 1938.

So, there's still at least a year left until the next world war?

Conditionally speaking, yes. But we still don't know whether this is merely a prelude or if it has already begun. Perhaps we are already in such a conflict, but we're simply closing our eyes to it. However, it's also possible that this conflict won't escalate at all – precisely because the "partition of Czechoslovakia" hasn't happened.

In other words, it's because President Joe Biden – and this may be his great historical role in the 21st century – did not turn out to be Neville Chamberlain.

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