In October 2023, following the Balticconnector [gas pipeline] and communications cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, Russian underwater activity became a topic of discussion. Now, after two communications cables were severed in the Baltic Sea, the issue is back in focus.

The United States and several other Western nations have identified that Russian naval activity in areas where undersea cables run has been steadily increasing. This interest is not limited to communications cables, as underwater pipelines and power cables have also drawn significant attention for some time.

Expanding on the topic, it is worth noting Russia's terrestrial sabotage activities in Western countries as well, of which there are numerous recent examples. The aim is, on one hand, to keep Western societies in a constant state of uncertainty, and on the other, to identify opportunities to launch hybrid attacks when necessary. The British intelligence agency MI6 and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have officially warned about Russian diversion campaigns.

For underwater activities, Russia has a dedicated unit with the acronym GUGI, or the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, which operates under the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

Last year, a joint investigation by the public broadcasters of Sweden, Norway and Finland revealed that Russia has an entire fleet of intelligence vessels believed to operate in Northern European waters. These vessels are seen as capable of carrying out potential sabotage against underwater cables and wind farms. GUGI's submarine specialists are reportedly able to work with mini-submarines at depths of up to six kilometers. Additionally, Russia has the authority to mandate civilian ships to carry out military operations, meaning every Russian ship is essentially a potential spy or sabotage platform.

According to data firm TeleGeography, there are currently 600 operational or planned underwater cables worldwide, with a total length of more than 1.4 million kilometers – three times the distance between the Earth and the Moon. It is no surprise, then, that incidents occur with these cables every year.

Approximately 100 to 200 cable damages are reported annually. Most are accidental, typically caused by ship anchors or bottom trawls, but numerous cases have been documented where cables have been deliberately cut. Responsibility for cable security lies with the companies that own them, which are private enterprises.

This raises questions about collaboration between governments and private companies to secure these cables. Although cables are buried in the seabed and data flow is monitored to detect faults, no existing measure provides full protection.

Although Western governments have been concerned about the security of information flow for a long time, the topic has gained sharp attention recently due to incidents in the Baltic Sea and the Red Sea.

According to a London-based think tank, since 2021, there have been eight incidents in the Euro-Atlantic region involving severed cables, where the culprit cannot be definitively identified but there is sufficient reason to believe the damages were intentional. In addition, 70 incidents have been recorded where Russian ships have behaved unusually near critical underwater infrastructure. Norwegian intelligence has reported that Russia has been mapping Norway's critical underwater oil and gas pipelines for years, and this activity continues.

Cutting cables could serve broader military goals, such as disabling American drones or undermining Western intelligence systems, which rely heavily on the internet. Repairing cables is a complex task. Globally, there are about 60 specialized ships for such repairs, meaning that fixing a fault could take months.

It was previously assumed that Russia was not technically capable of destroying the transatlantic cable network, but Moscow has made advancements. In the Atlantic Ocean, activity has so far been largely limited to monitoring and mapping cables. Recently, news surfaced about a Russian intelligence vessel being redirected from an area near Ireland, where it had no reason to be but where underwater cables are located.

It is worth remembering that these cables carry not only internet traffic but also intergovernmental communications, which, although encrypted, physically rely on the cables. Additionally, these cables transmit global financial system data, the lifeblood of banking. Interrupting this flow would have massive financial and economic consequences.

Russia amplifies the perception of threat regarding underwater cables. Recall that in the summer of 2023, Dmitry Medvedev stated that Russia no longer has any restrictions on destroying its enemies' communications cables on the seabed. At the same time, Russia typically accuses the other side of such plans, as recently done by Nikolai Patrushev, a maritime adviser to the Russian president and chair of the Maritime Collegium. Patrushev, a former KGB operative and former secretary of the Security Council, may have been assigned this maritime role by Vladimir Putin for this very reason.

Russia's advantage over the West is its lower dependence on these cables, as a continental country with land-based internet connections to Europe and Asia.

Finally, regarding the recent cable cuts, suspicion has fallen on a ship owned by a Chinese company. Whether it is to blame, I do not know. However, it is worth remembering that a large container ship that temporarily disables its transponder in a given area could serve as a cover for a smaller vessel without a transponder to operate covertly. Identifying the true culprit behind underwater operations is challenging.

We also do not know what the Russians have been doing underwater. It is possible that cables are being gradually mined so they can be disabled with a signal from nearby when needed. This raises the question of how governments, let alone private companies, could respond at the critical moment if underwater communications were severed. Satellites are one option, but they are reportedly less reliable. This leaves us with carrier pigeons and couriers, or perhaps we should consider whether regular monitoring of cables with technical tools should be implemented urgently.

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