It is increasingly looking like the Ukraine war will grind to a halt one way or another next year. While it will likely not end, there will be a freeze. The West seems to be looking for a way out, meaning that we are looking at a situation where Russia will have a lot of freed up military resources. What does that hold for us?

I believe the West is not looking for a way out. Rather, there are efforts to arrive at a logical way to stop the killing, if only temporarily, until a solution is found for the broader war. Next year could indeed bring new developments, including talks of some kind. Whether that will happen and how will likely become clear in the coming months. But a frozen conflict in Europe is quite likely next year.

A few weeks ago, you said, when commenting on Russia's potential future actions: "Our starting point should be that there will be escalation. The question is where, when and how?" Do you perhaps also have an answer?

Coming up with scenarios is a thankless task.

And yet unavoidable in planning.

Indeed. We have seen new developments in recent weeks also in terms of global competition, including the fall of the regime in Syria. Rather than an unexpected twist, this was a long-planned step taken at the right time, when the Assad regime and Russia's support for it were sufficiently weak. That is precisely the prism through which we should evaluate the likelihood of escalation.

I've said in all interviews that we are living difficult times in terms of national security, and they will become more difficult still. Russia has not taken its 2021 ultimatums off the table. That is why I see no indicators to suggest there will not be escalation. The question is where, when and how.

That is why we need to rapidly ramp up our military national defense. So when Russia looks at the map in terms of which strategic goals to pursue, it would conclude that any adventures in the Baltics would fail.

Where else could Russia potentially escalate things?

We have seen Russia's so-called hybrid activities. They've done various things both globally and in Europe. Georgia falling back into Russia's embrace, efforts to influence election results in Moldova – Russia is demonstrating that it's active everywhere. We've seen no concessions in Africa either.

But I dare say that plenty has changed in our region. Publicly available information suggests that Russia has over 600,000 fighters tied up in the Ukraine conflict. That is several times the number they had when the war started. If freezing the conflict opens the door to pulling out 350,000 of their 600,000 troops, it makes no sense for them to send these trained and experienced units home. Rather, they should be put to use somewhere. /.../

The question we need to ask is whether Russia thinks a Baltic adventure could work. We cannot underestimate the risks associated with only a part of Russia's military resources being freed from Ukraine.

There has been a lot of public debate over whether €1.6 billion worth of munitions procurements could happen sooner than 2031. Some say that it's not wise to buy so much ammunition all at once because it ages and will soon need to be replaced. Others say that we won't be able to take delivery of the things we need in good time anyway, so it makes no sense to plan resources ahead of time. While yet others say we should wait as there might be something more effective and cheaper on the market a few years from now.

The government has approved the appropriation, which is indicative of the resolve to take difficult decisions in tough times. Tax hikes are a direct side-effect of this, and we have clearly demonstrated as a state that we are united and willing to defend ourselves.

All three arguments have merits, while the final truth is always elsewhere. While it is true that ammunition does have a finite shelf life, we need to look at what we are buying and over how long a time.

Secondly, it's no secret that certain types of munitions are hard to find because of soaring demand. Finally, as concerns alternatives, it is quite possible there will be things available next summer that do not exist today.

Does that mean spreading these expenses out until 2031 was your proposal?

No. You can see just what the EDF said in its advice when you look back to the spring debate.

But I'm happy with the compromise. Defense Forces members are fully aware of where money comes from. We feel the effects just the same. We see the tax hikes, the need to spend money in other places and not where it would make our everyday lives easier.

Our proposal was to do it even faster. And believe me when I tell you that alternatives were analyzed, also by the government. Spreading those €1.6 billion out over a number of years allows us to keep developing our capabilities, and the use of the money can be moved up if necessary.

Next comes the question of whether the things we need to buy are available. The Defense Investments Center (RKIK) is working hard to find the things we could buy. It may very well boil down to availability before money. But I remain optimistic.

Our artillery has guided munitions with a range of 70-100 kilometers. Getting our hands on ammunition for the HIMARS system with a range of 70 or 150 kilometers is not too difficult either. The Israeli Harpy systems can also hit 100 kilometers away. However, there are plans to discontinue the ATACMS missile, which has a range of 300 kilometers, and it is hugely expensive to boot. Estonia has been faced with the question of whether there is an alternative we could use for some time. Have you found a solution?

This debate is ongoing. Were it only as simple as taking the next thing. But we're seeing the Ukrainians striking distant targets using homemade means, which utilize an entirely different kind of technology. It's up to us to find the alternatives that work for us, and we've suggested Estonia could have the capacity to offer some domestic options. Therefore, I, once again, remain an optimist.

RKIK recently opened a €400 million loitering munitions framework tender, with bids welcome both for small short-range drones as well as things that have a range of 300 or even a thousand kilometers. Could EDF planning stretch to a thousand kilometers one day?

I will not pledge any ranges. If someone offers us things that have a range of a thousand kilometers, we're prepared to listen and understand what they bring to the table. That said, while the €400 million we're planning to spend is a lot of money in Estonian context, it is not in the context of developing new capacity. Research and development alone could cost hundreds of millions. Therefore, we also expect major players with existing products, which may already have been tested in Ukraine, to take part.

New NATO defense plans were approved in Vilnius last summer. An agreement regarding states' individual targets should follow next fall. From there, it will take 15 years to develop these capacities. Isn't that a little slow? Are we not risking the enemy derailing the process?

The generals in charge of NATO collective defense plans are, in some ways, geniuses and perfectly capable of thinking these things through. And many things do have a long-term effect. That is why preparations sport a long perspective and provide input for new systems to be developed. I believe that the most important thing today is letting weapons manufacturers know that there's money on the table.

But I would also emphasize that NATO defense plans are continually revised and potential steps by the adversary anticipated. One of the goals of capabilities development is to influence the adversary's decision-making process. They will also need to keep themselves up to speed, which is no easy task. /.../

But is the money really on the table, and should the adversary believe that our Vilnius defense plans have substance? Right now, it seems we couldn't hit the new targets even if all NATO members spent 2.5 percent of GDP on defense.

Looking at NATO members' combined defense budget, it is many times what Russia can muster. So, it is not a question of money so much as a question of which capabilities to develop and whether a regional repositioning is in order. In other words, we're talking less about national capacity and more about how states contribute to the ability to carry out NATO defense plans.

Some members located further away can use their means to support those closer to the threat.

What if NATO members' taxpayers find that their defense budgets shouldn't grow notably after all? Should we fail to hit the new targets everywhere, would that call for less ambitious plans? After all, it's difficult to plan when you have more resources on the map than you have in reality.

Again, we cannot say we lack the capacity to execute defensive plans. We have been active all along, and we've been contributing even more since the start of the war. Luckily, Russia has not failed to take steps that demonstrate to our allies that what we say should be taken seriously, and I'm sure it will take another such step to convince the few non-believers that are left before it comes at us with everything it's got.

Are you also optimistic about Donald Trump?

I'm not pessimistic, I can tell you that much. It is not up to soldiers to comment on political leadership, but I see no great drama in the [U.S.] election result. Looking back on Trump's last term, he toured Europe, saying that defense spending needs to grow. He was not wrong.

Estonia joined the Ottawa Convention against anti-personnel land mines in 2004. The explanatory memorandum of the bill suggested that, "following joining NATO, the likelihood of direct military threats against Estonia is minute." The situation has changed now, and the EDF is forced to analyze whether to adopt anti-personnel mines for the second time in just a short time. In 2022, the EDF found that the benefits would not outweigh the risks. Could your new analysis arrive at a different conclusion?

Putting the spotlight back on the Ottawa Convention is a political initiative and one I welcome. The EDF Headquarters is analyzing this matter as the security situation has indeed changed, and I will present the defense minister with my military advice in terms of how anti-personnel mines affect us and whether we should leave the Ottawa Convention.

But it's also true that there are many alternatives to anti-personnel mines today. Drones do a lot of things in Ukraine.

Unlike suggestions of just mining a dark sector and forgetting about it, minefields always need artillery cover and an eye kept on them. It is possible to achieve these things using drones in the air, instead of anti-personnel mines.

We are analyzing the situation, and one of the most important factors for me is looking at the effectiveness of anti-personnel mines in history, as well as modern alternatives. /.../ The EDF has learned to perform our tasks without anti-personnel mines, and we're doing just fine today.

Could a radio-initiated device that self destructs in a few hours or days be something that doesn't fall under the Ottawa Convention?

There is that. We need to look at what the convention covers, and it is possible these new solutions allow us to avoid taking a step that would undermine our own position that the current world order is based on rules and agreements between states. So we don't rush into quitting an agreement, which may not even be that much of a hindrance.

It's clear that modern systems are no longer the cheap, mass-produced anti-personnel mines that you can bury everywhere in hopes of keeping costs down. We cannot do that. It would be too dangerous for civilians, peace will return one day and we do not want to join the ranks of countries where mines are maiming and killing people decades after conflicts ended.

You said in late May that conscription needs to be thoroughly reformed in Estonia, so that we would stop producing conscripts who cannot or do not want to contribute to national defense. That military service should be for those who are motivated and would be of use. Have you given it more thought since then?

It makes for a very important topic. We haven't just given it more thought, we're in the middle of drawing up different solutions for fixing this problem and boosting the quality of training, so that reserve units would be better prepared to carry out their tasks.

The concept is in the works and there will be changes. Some changes have already taken place. If only that we continue to emphasize physical training. We are increasingly treating it as an integral part of battle readiness.

We've done simpler things, but changing the broader concept of military service is necessary, because what we put together 20 years ago and have been keeping alive with cosmetic changes since then might no longer be effective, considering the lessons of the Ukraine war.

I dare say today that compulsory military service will not become longer, meaning that we will fit [training] inside the allocated 12-month window. A lot will depend on the situation.

Conscripts ask us why couldn't they make a greater contribution toward national defense in the course of training. We need to think about how to contribute to combat readiness in the course of military service. I believe it is a normal part of being a soldier and preparing for wartime tasks.

Are we talking about weapons systems that need to be in a state of rapid readiness, such as HIMARS and anti-ship missile batteries?

Quite right. Capability development means having it ready and manufacturing situational awareness, instead of gathering dust in a warehouse. I believe contributing through combat readiness is an inseparable part of a soldier's life.

And this would help conscripts practice their future tasks, making sure they have more contact with it during training?

Precisely. They can practice, but the most important thing is affecting how they think. Combat readiness means carrying out your tasks and not having to squeeze the trigger if you're lucky. But the readiness, both mental and physical, needs to be there. The preparedness to pull the trigger must be there and it needs to be practiced.

You recently told your colleagues that 2026 could be a so-called gap year where the EDF only takes around a thousand conscripts, instead of the usual 4,000. That you could dedicate the year to training instructors for the core of the reform. Please elaborate.

The Defense Forces' ability to keep secrets never fails to amaze me. This information was meant for officers and senior non-commissioned officers serving in command positions in the EDF. It was not meant for public consumption yet.

But we can talk about it now.

It is still just an idea and one requiring many steps. But it is true that we cannot continue as we have done if we want to achieve a leap in quality. And I believe that EDF members who work with conscripts every day know that in order to make a change, some things need to be done differently for a time.

But I would not get ahead of processes, because it is not a decision for the EDF commander alone and will take a lot of convincing. We will comment once we have a ready solution.

But is it among your plans?

It is one option, which seems the most feasible and the quickest to produce results. But this info was mainly aimed at commanders at different levels in the EDF, as something they should give thought to and keep in mind in terms of the necessity of changes.

Is the idea to give instructors a year to learn and prepare for the new kind of military service? Also, would it create the problem of how to fill the gap this would leave in the training cycle?

There will not be a gap in the training cycle. That much is clear today. Our reservists are so well trained that keeping them in combat readiness a little while longer is not a problem.

And boosting the skills of our instructors is necessary because of what we are learning from Ukrainian battlefields. We receive new information every day, and we are playing catchup in more than a few fields. This means that reorganization requires every permanent member of the EDF, not just instructors, to take their skills to the next level, learn to act in modern battle environments and possibly look to the future in terms of what that battlefield should look like for us. /.../

It will not be an easy twelve months. While a gap year sounds good, I dare say it will be a lot more difficult for all involved than the annual training cycle, which has become routine over the last 20 years.

A few weeks after Sweden decided to abandon plans for offshore wind farms, high-ranking EDF members stepped up and said that Estonia's planned offshore wind farms would seriously harm maritime surveillance, the aiming of anti-ship missiles, as well as that we already have a problem with signal intelligence in Ida-Viru County. Why highlight this matter now?

The EDF did not highlight the topic. Sweden's very strong political decision put us in the spotlight again instead. We have been saying the same thing all along, even though an unfortunate narrative had appeared to suggest that the EDF was happy with the situation. We are not happy with everything, and we've been sending this message consistently.

Our input has been considered looking at compensation measures in the air. We need to arrive in the same place regarding wind and solar parks next. One does not have to be an engineer to realize these things interfere with disciplines and activities. We need to find solutions.

But to suggest today that things were decided ten years ago... The world was a different place ten years ago. The threat level was different.

So, we did not start it up again. We were put on the spot and had to say that things aren't what they seem. But we remain open to constructive cooperation today and we have experience in the Air Force context to suggest that the solutions are out there.

What I would like to emphasize is that we cannot just accept it when such interference is considerable. This might see us limit our own capacity and render investments in new capabilities useless.

However, I would emphasize once more that the EDF is not an opponent of green energy or wind farms. We understand that they are necessary for covering future energy needs unless we want to resort to even worse alternatives for electricity generation. But I also believe that the people understand well enough that it matters where we build these parks.

The Ministry of Defense said that when it comes to maritime surveillance, developers will be obligated to put in place compensation measures if necessary. The ministry also said that anti-ship missiles can be used against enemy ships before they disappear behind wind farms and once they come out again. And as concerns acoustic surveillance, wind farms are not a problem as we don't have underwater surveillance to begin with. Have these issues been addressed?

What you've listed are areas where there might be solutions. I see no conflict between the EDF and the ministry. We are in the same boat and need to find the solutions. That said, the political view is different from that of national defense. In the latter, many things can be simpler and more linear.

We are aware that we can fire missiles from different locations. But we need to come out and say it when we see that an important location is being blocked. I say that it is the duty of the EDF commander to draw attention to these things, instead of keeping my mouth shut or praising things that aren't right in national defense terms.

Please help clarify the anti-ship missiles angle. Because, strictly speaking, it is possible to fire at ships before and after they disappear behind wind farms. We also have allies and drones. Why are wind farms a problem?

It is a physical obstacle. You cannot fire if it's like a screen in your way.

How might we compensate here?

We need to find ways. For as long as we've not erected the turbines, we can look for alternatives and think about how to compensate for certain things. Should it turn out compensation is impossible and the situation creates a military vulnerability, as commander of the EDF, I cannot just stand down and say that a wind farm is a good fit there if we cannot accept the risks it poses.

The Finns are spending €1.3 billion to construct four 100-meter corvettes. Estonia needs to replace its ships soon too. Has thought been given to whether we should procure a mine countermeasures and patrol fleet or whether we should have vessels capable of firing anti-ship missiles?

Estonia is a maritime country, and we cannot prevent or win a war without naval presence. It is true that the Navy needs a new fleet. They are working on potential solutions and will likely come up with proposals as to how many and what kind of ships we need.

It's up to us to find the resources and decide how quickly to replace vessels. But it is clear the Navy needs the ability to influence the adversary. We can see peculiar things happening at sea also in peacetime. We need Navy presence to be able to prevent them. But it is too soon to speculate on concrete solutions.

But are we talking about a conceptual change compared to current capabilities?

There may be conceptual changes, as the situation is always changing.

Signals intelligence allows us to learn of enemy troop buildups, planes taking off in the distance and what our adversaries are discussing among themselves. The defense minister told "Aktuaalne kaamera" news on Sunday that while things are worse than they were a decade ago, the situation is nevertheless not bad. He added that the EDF has enough ways of sourcing intelligence. Are things worse or are they bad?

A soldier never has enough intelligence. No matter what we're talking about and when, intelligence is always in short supply. I absolutely do not think we have enough intelligence, and I'm sure we and most of our allies never will.

Gathering intelligence is a distinctive activity, with various disciplines dedicated to it.. It's literally a science where technology plays a crucial role. And if we say that things were better ten years ago, while they're not bad today, they're still not where they were a decade ago.

The situation has also changed. We need to look at the reasons and maybe avoid hurried decisions so as not to render intelligence more difficult. We have provided our input in terms of what to keep in mind, what to do and how to be where we need to be, instead of just going back to where we were ten years ago.

It is a problem. We have been providing our input all along, and we will continue to do it. But I will also not tell you that what the defense minister said is wrong.

We know how to compensate in air surveillance. We'll just install new radars and the wind farms will no longer be in the way. Things are not that simple when it comes to signals intelligence devices. Can we solve the problem by just adding more and more powerful hardware? Or do we need to look at the environment?

We need both. We need to look at the environment and find new technical solutions. Technology is developing rapidly. The aim of constructive dialogue is to find these solutions.

But I must reiterate that no one can say today that the EDF is without problems or lacks a standpoint. We have both, we're simply open to constructive cooperation. We do not want to influence economic decisions where we can help it, but I also cannot sacrifice military national defense as commander of the EDF. I do not have the right.

The Ministry of Defense proposed significantly easing restrictions on solar parks built within a 60-kilometer radius of radio intelligence equipment. They are basing this on calculations from Finland and Sweden, which suggest that so-called radio silence zones – areas near collection devices – could accommodate solar parks that are tens, if not hundreds, of times more powerful than currently allowed, as the impact diminishes rapidly with distance. Initially, the Defense Forces stated they did not agree. How much compromise is realistically possible in this situation?

I'm not a technical expert in the field, but our experts have told me it's a problem. They've also told me that we need to find technical solutions for maintaining or boosting these things to get the intelligence we need.

/.../

Estonia has promised to help Ukraine until it achieves victory, while the Americans have promised to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. If the war is frozen on the current contact line next year and hostilities cease there, will we be able to look the Ukrainians in the eye and say that we helped them achieve victory?

First, we need to define what it means to win the war. I've said publicly before that from my military point of view, there can be only one outcome that defines victory. It's when Ukraine's territorial integrity is restored to what it was before the start of Russian occupation in 2014.

Will we get there next year? Unlikely. Militarily speaking, it is a very difficult task to push the enemy out of the territory they've taken by force. Every day they hold on to the territory is spent reinforcing their positions and preparing to defend it.

We will support Ukraine in all kinds of ways – politically, militarily and economically. Because if we don't and if Ukraine loses this war – either next year or in the future – we will find ourselves in a completely new security situation the effects of which we cannot even imagine today.

Time will tell what 2025 will bring for the war, whether there will be a frozen conflict, whether Ukraine will be forced and Russia convinced to negotiate.

Personally, it seems to me that the Ukrainians have every reason to be disappointed in the West. Their losses are colossal, both in terms of human casualties and infrastructure. And they may ask why they weren't given more aid in decisive moments, such as in 2023. I would understand such frustration on the part of the Ukrainians.

But you'll have to ask the Ukrainians how they see the situation, whether they would welcome if only a temporary reprieve from the killing.

But if Ukraine is forced and Russia convinced to come to the negotiating table, if the front line is frozen, the running total for the West will be that we did not help Ukraine achieve victory and that Ukraine has lost the war.

I would not rush to say that Ukraine will have lost, because Russia expected them to lose in a week. But I believe at least that the Ukrainians won the first and decisive battle. They managed to prevent a quick overthrow and put up a hell of a fight. They are still putting up a hell of a fight. They've performed brilliant operations, taken back territory and even attacked Russia's. I would not rush to say Ukraine is set to lose, even if the conflict ends up frozen.

But history teaches us, also through the example of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, that the rest of the world tends to get used to the situation. And that counts toward Russia's theory of victory. I dare say that should there be a frozen conflict or a ceasefire in other words, Russia will have every opportunity to say it won.

They will anyway, of course. Though we may ask whether it is possible to call it a victory, looking at Russia's losses in terms of manpower, machinery and international reputation, in addition to losing ground outside Europe. While it is no true victory, Russia will call it just that, continue exactly as before and start gearing up for the next aggression. There can be no doubt.

I suppose it will eventually be up to historians to define who won and lost. Why Finland won the Winter War but lost the Continuation War, or whether they actually lost the Winter War in the end – such things can only be looked at in hindsight.

Hindsight is 20/20. But we also know that history is written by the victors. We've seen it many times. We need to be very careful and keep a vigilant eye on Ukraine developments.

But I remain an optimist. I believe that as Estonians, we are brave enough to support Ukraine until it achieves victory, even though we might not see things the same way as all our allies at all times.

And the Ukrainians are fighting bravely today. They are not fighting for us, they have been fighting and dying in our stead for years. Russia's decision to attack Ukraine signals that they simply lacked the strength to do it here. Had Ukraine fallen in the first weeks of the war, I dare say we would already be in one today.

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