Meelis Oidsalu: Could the Baltic states have a common military?

One prerequisite for creating a joint Baltic military force would be an agreement on which units would be placed under a common military commander, when that subordination would take effect and how extensive the commander's decision-making authority would be, Meelis Oidsalu writes.
On August 28, Sweden announced it would send Gripen fighter jets and a warship to Finland to help defend NATO's eastern border, and that these assets could be placed directly under Finnish command if necessary. During the two countries' first joint flight on September 24, fighter aircraft from both nations, operating under the command of Finland's Air Operations Center, identified Russian military aircraft over the Gulf of Finland.
This marks the next stage in the deepening of Nordic defense cooperation, one of whose foundations is the NORDEFCO military cooperation framework established in 2009, partly as a cost-saving measure following the financial crisis.
Russia's aggression in 2014 led Finland and Sweden to begin joint wartime planning and intensified their operational cooperation with Norway. Their subsequent NATO membership tied regional defense more closely to alliance planning. The result has been improved cross-border military mobility, integrated command structures and an ambition among the four countries to operate their roughly 250 fighter aircraft as a single air force.
This regional division of labor is also supported by the location of NATO headquarters. The land operations headquarters is located in Mikkeli, Finland; the air operations headquarters in Bodø, Norway; and the special operations headquarters in Aalborg, Denmark. Sweden plays a central role as the region's logistical hub.
In an article published in Foreign Affairs on October 30 titled "Can the Nordic Model Save NATO?", Finnish Institute of International Affairs senior research fellow Matti Pesu presents Nordic defense cooperation as an example of how the alliance could be strengthened through smaller, self-sufficient defense clusters. For the Baltic states and Poland, this raises the question of what agreements on joint action should already be in place before a crisis emerges.
According to Pesu, such agreements could concern the use of long-range weapons and the sharing of ammunition stockpiles in situations where a military defense operation is needed in the region but NATO's collective response is still taking shape.
In air force cooperation, Baltic military integration within NATO is already partly a reality. BALTNET integrates the air surveillance and command capabilities of all three Baltic states and includes a jointly staffed command center in Karmėlava, Lithuania. One country's surveillance and command units can support NATO air and missile defense operations in the airspace of the other Baltic states. Operational control itself is exercised through the regional air command center in Germany.
In 2015, the Baltic states established the Baltic Commanders Joint Staff Element (B-CJSE), tasked with coordinating operational-level defense planning. In practice, however, it functions more as a joint working group than a true headquarters. In January 2024, the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a framework agreement on the peacetime and wartime joint use of HIMARS systems. Last October, they agreed to coordinate targeting to ensure neighboring countries do not independently strike the same targets and waste ammunition.
Cooperation with Poland has also already begun to deepen. In September 2024, the defense ministers of the four countries agreed to coordinate the development of military defense lines. Most recently, in October, the chiefs of defense of Lithuania and Poland discussed implementation of the Orsha defense plan, originally signed in 2022.
The bilateral plan governs military cooperation on both sides of the border, including the defense of the Suwałki Gap and Lithuanian territory, and has been exercised together with other NATO allies. It is a local plan designed to complement NATO defense plans, although the exact activation and command arrangements are not public.
Building on Matti Pesu's analysis, one might ask whether these military integration measures are sufficient or whether a serious planning exercise should be undertaken to envision a Baltic defense structure that would allow for a jointly commanded force in wartime even in the absence of a NATO defense operation. Polish participation would be an essential component of such a plan.
One prerequisite for creating a joint Baltic military force would be agreement on which units would be placed under a common military commander, when that arrangement would take effect and how extensive the commander's authority would be. Estonian law already allows parts of command authority to be transferred to foreign commanders and for Estonia to assume command over foreign units. A permanent joint wartime command structure, however, would require much broader agreements among the states and a far more detailed plan.
Such military units, able to operate freely across the Baltic states and be used interchangeably, could retain their national composition, language and traditions. The key question would be whether the joint commander could actually deploy the forces assigned to him or whether every major decision would still require approval from three separate capitals.
If integration reached that level, it would make sense to conclude a ratified defense treaty among the three countries defining the mission, political oversight and military chain of command of the force placed under common control.
The most difficult agreement would likely concern activation of a local Baltic defense plan. One possible model would be a joint political council of governments that approves defense plans. An attack on one participant should trigger collective defense, not negotiations over whether and how to assist a neighbor in distress.
A second prerequisite for a joint Baltic force would be credible long-term financing. Such a force cannot be planned if one participant is free to reduce its contribution unilaterally every budget year and leave the shortfall to others. The funding difficulties surrounding Rail Baltica show how important it is to link long-term shared plans with a credible financing model.
Compared with maintaining separate armed forces, the greatest potential strength of a joint force would be the rapid concentration of military power at decisive points across the region. Unified command could integrate air defense, long-range fires, intelligence, reserves and stockpiles into a single structure, avoiding situations where each country optimizes its own sector while leaving critical gaps in the broader Baltic defense theater.
Joint planning would also force more honest assessments of which units actually exist, how quickly they can move and which missions they would prioritize. Such calculations have already been made as part of NATO's Baltic defense plans, but a joint Baltic force concept could also explore what Pesu refers to in his article as regional military self-sufficiency.
A second strength of a joint Baltic force would be the ability to develop capabilities for which each country individually lacks sufficient specialists and funding. Joint training on similar weapons systems, shared management of equipment life cycles, communications and logistics could reduce duplication and concentrate scarce expertise. Officer education is already conducted jointly at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, and such cooperation could be extended to the tactical level.
A third advantage could be stronger deterrence. Pre-agreed command arrangements and authorities would shorten the time required to convert a political decision to assist into actual military action. If an attack on one country automatically mobilized the forces of all three according to prearranged procedures, an adversary would have fewer opportunities to divide them politically.
The Baltic states could look to several existing European cooperation models when considering the creation of such a regional defense cluster. One of the closest examples is the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which includes the United Kingdom, the five Nordic countries, the three Baltic states and the Netherlands. The JEF allows the United Kingdom to act with one or more participating nations without waiting for unanimous consent. Each country independently decides whether to contribute forces.
Even deeper integration can be seen in the naval cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands. They share operational command and a headquarters in Den Helder, while also cooperating extensively in maintenance and training. Belgium and the Netherlands alternate responsibility for Benelux air policing. For the Baltic states, this offers important lessons on dividing routine responsibilities, sharing maintenance costs and preparing units to operate under common command.
For land force integration, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania might look to Germany and the Netherlands. Since 2023, all three Dutch Army combat brigades have been integrated into German divisions while preserving Dutch national decision-making authority over their deployment. The Baltic states could adopt a similar model by permanently linking specific units to the same headquarters and neighboring formations. Regular joint planning and training would make wartime command arrangements more routine.
Such a joint force would also carry risks. Integrating plans and capabilities would increase interdependence. If specialization progressed so far that only one country developed a critical capability, destruction of that country's infrastructure or disruption of its communications could undermine the defense of all three states. Separate systems involve costly duplication, but some duplication serves as essential wartime redundancy. Therefore, even a joint Baltic force would need to preserve independent mobilization systems, territorial defense, basic logistics and autonomous operating capabilities within each state.
The geography of military requirements also does not fully align with a three-country Baltic format. Estonia's defense is tied to the Gulf of Finland and Finland itself, while Lithuania's security is closely linked to the Suwałki Gap and Poland. Full integration would be a poor bargain if it complicated cooperation with those partners.
Nevertheless, the possibility of creating a joint Baltic military force deserves serious analysis by comparing three options: enhanced cooperation among separate national armed forces, the creation of a force with permanent joint operational command, and fully integrated armed forces.
Even if the ultimate decision is to retain three separate militaries, seriously considering the concept of a joint Baltic force would clarify the prospects for deeper military cooperation.
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Editor: Kaupo Meiel, Argo Ideon











