Martin Herem: An information operation built on sabotage

Russia's attacks against Estonian defense industry companies are unlikely to intimidate either the companies themselves or society as a whole. However, the real impact and benefit may lie in the chain of events that follows, and that may have been exactly what the GRU intended to achieve, writes Martin Herem.
Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU, carried out an attack against an Estonian defense industry company. Unsuccessfully. In essence, for the second time since August.
One might assume this was the result of carelessness or incompetence. The excellent work of the security services of several countries certainly deserves recognition. While this can generally be viewed as a failure, events of recent days have made me question that assessment. I now consider the results far more successful than they initially appeared.
No major material damage was caused. Apparently, none was caused in the previous incident either. These attacks are unlikely to frighten companies or society as a whole, but their impact and value may lie in the processes they set in motion afterward. That may have been precisely what the GRU was aiming for.
The first "result" is something we will inevitably create ourselves if we close border crossings with Russia. Regardless of the economic costs involved, such a decision would generate extensive debate and criticism among politicians and within society, as well as abroad. Government institutions would be forced into action, explaining processes and objectives with little practical benefit. Providing explanations may accomplish very little, but it certainly creates a workload.
In addition, debates would emerge around issues such as whether the border should have been closed long ago, whether the Latvian border should also be closed, whether this outcome was predictable, whether some people should still be allowed to cross for particular reasons, whether decisions are being driven by emotion rather than rational calculation, and so on.
As a result, people who should be focusing on genuinely important work will spend the coming days and weeks explaining, reporting, gathering facts and debunking misinformation. Countless unproductive work hours will be consumed. Important matters will be delayed.
Because the sabotage operation was carried out so poorly and our countermeasures were so effective, some people will naturally ask who was really behind it and what the actual objective was.
If that question arises in the mind of someone who already holds negative views toward the authorities, it becomes more likely that the "real" beneficiary will be seen not as Russia but as Estonia's own security services and government. In that case, the GRU achieves a second "result": in addition to controversy over a border closure, suspicion shifts toward the state itself.
More disappointed people will inevitably join in. Trust will erode for a time, while fertile ground will be created for other, perhaps future, conspiracy theories. In a democratic country with freedom of speech and a strong internet connection, this effect spreads at the speed of light, pausing only occasionally to pick up a few absurd comments along the way.
Defense industry companies, meanwhile, will spend resources improving their security. Companies involved in projects supporting Ukraine will request confidentiality. Those demanding transparency in decision-making will call for the publication of company lists. And thus another "debate" begins, once again burdening people and organizations with unnecessary expenditures of time and effort.
At some point, the Latvian origin of the sabotage suspects may also become an issue, triggering criticism of Latvian institutions and reopening discussions about controls on the Estonia-Latvia border.
I do not know how much this operation cost the Russians, but we will likely spend considerably more on securing companies and on all the public discussion it generates. The effects, including distrust and resentment, may last far longer. Latvia, meanwhile, gains eight citizens who can be portrayed as suspicious elements, potentially prompting increased scrutiny of certain groups. That, in turn, consumes additional resources and further reduces trust within society. Each future operation of this kind only adds momentum to the information operation described above.
So perhaps this was not really a failure after all. We simply failed to see the true objective behind the smoke from the arson attack. Perhaps the GRU never planned it this way, but that is certainly how it turned out.
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Editor: Kaupo Meiel, Argo Ideon











